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ABSTRACT 
 
For Ahmadi Muslims in the Indian town of Qadian, a major part of ethical 
behaviour is the cultivation of a relationship of subordination to potent religious 
truths. This involves both manifesting and witnessing the truth of their religion in 
the form of polemical arguments and religious travel. I argue that understanding 
how moral character develops out of such a relationship requires us to turn our 
analytical attention away from agency and toward responsibility. Such a move 
has important implications for the more general anthropological study of theisms. 
 
This article is an exploration of an ethical project in which virtue is 
nurtured through a very specific relationship to truth.  It focuses upon 
members of the Ahmadiyya Community in India – a group whose 
Muslim identity is frequently contested or denied by others – to 
examine how they conceptualize their own (ever disputed) Muslimness 
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as a question of being the kind of person who is able to witness truth 
as present in divine proofs and polemical arguments. Witnessing has 
always been central to Islam: the martyr, or shahid, is the supreme 
witness to the religion, while the declaration of faith is referred to as 
the shahada, an act of testimony. This article follows recent 
anthropological attempts to probe the ethical complexities of being a 
witness (e.g. Mittermaier 2011; Segal 2015). For the Ahmadis, to be a 
witness means positioning oneself in a relationship to truth such that 
one can attribute something of one’s own ethical formation to it.  In 
short, this is the study of an ethical project that involves subordinating 
the self to a higher truth and attempting to thus live a life that is wholly 
ordered by this subordination.  
 
This state of affairs raises an interesting analytical problem, which can 
more generally be observed in anthropological accounts of theisms. 
This is the question of how we should write about agency in the 
context of the relationships people have to a metaphysical other. If we 
follow the lead of much recent anthropology and make agency the 
centrepiece of our argument, then we end up with an analysis that 
either privileges an inward-facing self-cultivating individual, or we 
attribute agency to metaphysical others in such a way that we lose 
sight of what is actually ethical about people’s actions. I suggest that 
neither of these approaches can illuminate my ethnography of Qadian, 
which is best understood through an analytical focus not on agency, 
but on how individuals assign responsibility (Laidlaw 2010). 
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Focusing on responsibility in this way reveals that coherent moral 
character in Qadian is seen to emerge from a person’s fidelity to 
performing and witnessing truth. Within recent ethnographies of 
Muslims, there has been some debate about whether it is possible to 
live a singular life of disciplined cohesion (Janson 2014; Marsden 
2009a; Schielke 2009; Simon 2009). I suggest that the ethical project I 
observed in Qadian – of completely subordinating the self to a potent 
truth – is liable to be misread unless we begin to move away from a 
vocabulary of agency in our study of moral character. 
 
THE AHMADIYYA JAMA‘AT 
 
This article is based on 15 months of fieldwork in Qadian, India, 
birthplace of the Ahmadiyya Jama‘at (community) and its founder, the 
self-proclaimed prophet and Messiah, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (c.1830s – 
1908). Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s followers – Ahmadis – claim not to be 
propagating a new form of Islam, but instead returning to the 
authentic version of Islam first revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. 
For many other Muslims in Pakistan, India, and just about everywhere 
else, however, Ahmadis are the paradigmatic modern unbelievers. The 
exclusion of the Ahmadis from the body politic of South Asian Islam 
has its roots in complex historical, social and theological processes. For 
those in Qadian, however, there is a simple explanation; Mirza Ghulam 
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Ahmad was a true prophet of Islam and, they argue, all true prophets 
face rabid opposition.  
 
Ahmad first gained public attention in Punjab in a period of intense 
religious debate, when many new sects were emerging, and religious-
community lines were being codified. From the late 1880s, he was 
heavily involved in the polemical defence of his version of Islam 
against other Muslim reformers, Christian missionaries, and Hindu 
activists (Friedmann 2003). The title of Ghulam Ahmad’s most 
important work, Barahin-e-Ahmadiyya, translates as Arguments or 
Proofs of Ahmadiyya, and in it he claims to present “300 
incontrovertible rational arguments” (Ahmad 2012: 74) in support of 
Islam. The need for this, Ahmad explains, is that “the pitch darkness 
that has engulfed the world will only be dispelled when a vast number 
of proofs in support of Islam enlighten the world and the rays of its 
truth spread in all directions” (Ahmad 2012: 79). Ahmad’s major 
prophetic labour was thus the delivery of arguments in favour of his 
own prophethood in a language that he over and again insisted was 
rational, and in a manner that drew upon multiple sources of 
evidential truth, among them revelatory, archaeological, scriptural, 
and historical. For many of my interlocutors, the most complete 
demonstration of this faculty was Ahmad’s use of multiple sources of 
evidence to prove that Jesus escaped death on the cross, passed 
through Asia to India, and died a natural death in Kashmir (Ahmad 
2008). The tract in which Ahmad made this argument established the 
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theological groundwork for his own claim to be a Promised Messiah 
distinct from Jesus. 
 
Since Ahmad’s death (1908), the Jama‘at has been led by a Caliph, or 
Khalifa, the present Khalifa being the fifth incumbent of this role1. A 
central theme of official history under Caliphate, or Khilafat, is the 
Jama‘at’s supposed rapid expansion to over 200 countries and its 
newfound visibility in the form of its global Satellite TV channels.  By 
spreading globally, the Jama‘at has, for believers, come to fulfil 
Ahmad’s prophecies of success: it has become a marvel to witness.  
 
Ahmad lived most of his life in the Punjabi town of Qadian. During 
Partition (1947), Qadian fell narrowly within India, and after a 
protracted but ultimately failed attempt to keep the community 
headquarters there, the majority of Ahmadis left for Pakistan2. A small 
contingent of men remained to protect the graves of Ghulam Ahmad 
and the other holy sites of the town. The present Ahmadi population of 
Qadian remain a minority at roughly 4000 of the town’s 22,000 
population3.  
 
Those Ahmadis who moved to Pakistan – the majority of the 
community – have suffered significant persecution, and in 1984 during 
the rule of General Zia, a legal ordinance was promulgated which 
established by law that Ahmadis are non-Muslim, and thus ‘effectively 
criminalized their everyday life’ (Khan 2012: 108). The ordinance 
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added two new clauses (298 B and C) to the Penal Code, making 
certain names, titles, and practices exclusive to Muslims. If the 
Ahmadis act, talk or behave ‘like Muslims’, for example, if they describe 
their places of worship as mosques, they can be imprisoned for up to 
three years for ‘posing’ as a Muslim. Since 1984, the Khilafat has been 
based, in exile, in Southfields, London. The majority of the Jama‘at’s 
followers and its bureaucratic structure remain in Pakistan, although 
increasingly, media operations have been moved to the UK, where a 
small but vocal community reside.  
 
This paper, however, focuses closely upon the group who remain in 
Qadian. It is about how Qadian’s Ahmadis claim to live lives structured 
by recognition of the truth of the Jama‘at. 
 
DOCUMENTABLE TRUTHS 
 
Once a year in late December, Qadian is transformed by the Jalsa 
Salana, or Annual Gathering. The street running through the Muslim 
neighbourhood is divided by a central barrier, so that throngs of men 
and women may move through the town without mixing, and two 
arenas, each capable of seating thousands of people, are constructed so 
that the genders may gather separately4. Almost every able-bodied 
Ahmadi resident in Qadian is engaged by a specific duty for several 
weeks as the town is swelled by up to 25,000 guests from across India 
and the world. Hosting these guests is a huge and daunting task for the 
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small Ahmadi population, and the yearly calendar of the town is 
organized around this gigantic and divinely ordained task. Not only are 
Ahmadis expected to attend, but all members of the Jama‘at who earn 
money must pay 1/120th of their yearly income to support this 
gathering. Nowadays, Jalsa Salanas are held in every country in which 
Ahmadis are to be found in large numbers, but the Qadian Jalsa is the 
original event. 
 
Qadian is transformed for the three days of the Jalsa. Family reunions 
occur, old friends catch up, and the overwhelming feeling that my 
interlocutors reported was of a spiritual atmosphere in which one 
could visibly witness the success of the Jama‘at. For many, the most 
significant feature of the Qadian Jalsa is the arrival of up to 5000 
Pakistanis who are granted visas specifically for this event. Since 1984 
the Government of Pakistan has refused the community permission to 
hold their own Jalsa Salanas, and many of the youngest Pakistanis have 
never attended one before. For both Pakistanis and Indians this 
becomes a chance to create new bonds of friendship and acquaintance 
with those normally separated by an impermeable border. 
 
The experiential potency of the Jalsa, however, is not just a product of 
its liminal status. As my interlocutors guided me through the Jalsa, 
they also sought to train my eye upon several key features. Most 
importantly, they encouraged me to witness the disciplined behaviour 
of all those in attendance; the lack of quarrels, the sense of order as 
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everybody followed the rules and the system which regulated this. 
This is not a peculiarity of Qadian: a general guide for worldwide jalsa 
etiquette describes how the correct ordered form of the event is to be 
achieved, and instructs attendees to “try to portray the true and 
beautiful image of the Jamaat to outsiders, especially our neighbors”5. 
The result is an exemplary image of harmony and coherence, the 
witnessing of which produces a feeling of intense spirituality and 
intoxication both for those in attendance and those watching the 
events as they are broadcast live on the community satellite TV 
channel. Where else in the world, several people asked me, could you 
find such a large group of people behaving so peacefully? But this 
peacefulness mattered not because it was peaceful per se but because 
it indexed a broader truth about the Jama‘at. The following example 
will help to elucidate this. 
 
In December 2010 I had just attended my first Jalsa in Qadian. I had 
been in the town only a few weeks, when I found myself in a 
conversation with a teacher from the Ahmadi theological college in 
Pakistan. We were walking through the market, freely exploring the 
town, a space that was strangely familiar and yet disconcerting for 
many of the Pakistanis I met, for it was a Punjab that was not 
dominated by Islam, but was instead a place of heterogeneous faiths 
and ‘false idols’. This teacher, only just qualified as a cleric, engaged me 
in fluent and confident English on the topic of shirk, or idolatry. 
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Did I, as somebody from a Christian country, really believe in the 
Trinity, he asked? I didn’t, but I could see that my interlocutor desired 
the sport of debating, so I played devil’s advocate with a long-forgotten 
Christian belief system, while he tried to convince me of the logical 
superiority of the Ahmadi interpretation of Islam. The Ahmadis, he 
explained, are the only extant community who believe in continuing 
divine revelation and contact with God. Replying to this, I told the 
young teacher that some Charismatic Christians I know back in the UK 
very much believe that they can communicate with God, and what is 
more, see prophesy, revelation, and divinely inspired dreams - in sum, 
all those things that my informant had claimed were exclusive to 
Ahmadiyyat - as part of the everyday fabric of their lives. My 
interlocutor was surprised by this, and pressed me further on the 
issue. 
 
“But do they have prophecies which they write down, which they 
publish?” he asked me. 
 
“I don’t know” I replied, then remembering another example said, “but 
I know that there often has to be documented proof of a miracle for a 
Catholic Saint to be created.” 
 
Yet my interlocutor remained unconvinced, and again asked the same 
question, “but do they publish their prophecies?” 
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For this interlocutor, the wondrous quality of prophetic dreams was 
explicitly linked to their documentability. I had expected dreams to be 
ethical because of their experiential qualities and yet over and again, it 
was made clear that what really mattered was the way in which 
dreams afforded a vantage point from which to witness a particular 
kind of empirically verifiable truth. The same thing was true for my 
previous example about the Jalsa; it created wonder not just because 
of its liminal qualities, but because it was a visible, documentable, 
display of discipline that indexed the truth of Ahmadiyyat. For the 
Ahmadis with whom I spent the next fifteen months, recorded dreams, 
the arguments of their sect, the exemplary figures they look up to, and 
the very system of the Jama‘at – that is, the worldwide bureaucratic 
structure spanning 200 countries – were the paradigmatic empirical 
proofs of revelation. 
 
THE PERFORMANCE AND WITNESSING OF TRUTH 
 
The truths of Ahmadiyyat are said to be so potent that they are capable 
of reducing opponents to silence, and stories circulate in Qadian that 
attest to this. One particular tale concerned the book Revelation, 
rationality, knowledge and truth by the Fourth Khalifa (Ahmad 1998), 
which is widely admired by Ahmadis for being a defence of the 
existence of God using the tools of science. The Jama‘at is said to have 
sent copies of this book to many hundreds of atheist scientists, 
including Richard Dawkins, along with a challenge to disprove the 
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arguments that it contained. During one retelling of this story, an 
interlocutor jubilantly concluded that, “not one scientist was able to 
send a response!” I questioned him further, asking whether it was 
possible that the scientists did not read the book. My interlocutor did 
not agree, and becoming perturbed by my inability to immediately 
grasp the forcefulness of Ahmadi argumentation, he explained that 
scientists enjoy reading books, and their lack of response must have 
been down to their inability to argue back. 
 
As we shall see in the coming section, both performing and witnessing 
proofs 6  is central to being a good Ahmadi. Everyday religious 
discourse in Qadian is filled with stories of opponents who were 
bested in argument by Ahmadi missionaries, or of fierce adversaries 
who, upon coming across the incontrovertible proofs of Ahmadiyyat, 
would be so overcome by their own inability to respond that they 
would at once convert. Above all, there is an everyday pride – 
evidenced by the repeated telling of stories such as that about the 
scientists – that the truths of Ahmadiyyat are unlike the truths of other 
religions, for they are backed up by multiple layers of evidentiary 
proof. 
 
Contemporary Qadian is not always a good place for the actual practice 
of polemics – due to political vulnerabilities going back to partition, the 
Jama‘at’s relations with neighbouring communities are noticeably non-
confrontational – yet the cultivation of good character is bound up in a 
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sense of the heroics of disputation. The wife of one elderly man once 
told me with pride that her husband would, in his youth; “debate 
(bahas) with all kinds of opponents, and not one could give any reply 
to him!” I later realised how affectionate such a statement was, for it 
established him as a man to be recognised and admired, a complete 
man. Likewise, particular presenters on the Jama‘at’s Satellite TV 
channels were widely praised for having a mastery over proofs such 
that opponents would routinely be unable to respond to them with 
anything other than insults. One presenter in particular was lauded for 
having singlehandedly pioneered the advancement of the Jama‘at in 
the Middle East due to his skill in deploying the proofs of Ahmadiyyat. 
As the next example shows, performing the proofs of Ahmadiyyat so 
that they can be easily admired is a central part of what it means to 
speak well as an Ahmadi. 
 
In late March 2012, the young men of one of Qadian’s neighbourhood 
divisions organized an open-air question and answer panel. Events 
such as this, geared toward the edification and religious education of 
the population, occur on a regular basis and are all but compulsory for 
Ahmadi men in the town. In this case, a panel of scholars was present 
on stage, with the audience in neat rows of seating in front of them. 
The event was recorded by multiple video cameras, and to the side, the 
Chief Secretary of the Indian Jama‘at presided over the occasion from 
an armchair. 
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The theme of the discussion was the difference between the Ahmadis 
and other sects, a topic of much intellectual activity for the Ahmadis 
and their opponents. Crucial to the logic of this event was the self-
consciously performative nature of the questions; the way their 
pointed phrasing belied the questioners’ evident knowledge of answer; 
their precise formulation that facilitated a response in the form of a 
spectacle of truths.  For example, one questioner asked, “in accordance 
with the Quran and Hadith, can a prophet come after Muhammad? And 
what kind of prophet is Mirza Ghulam Ahmad?” This question might 
seem strange to an outsider, yet for those in attendance it signalled an 
invitation for the panel to retell the Ahmadi argument that Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood does not violate Muhammad’s station 
as seal of the prophets7. Likewise, another questioner asked, “non-
Ahmadis abrogate8 many verses from the Qur’an. But the promised 
Messiah declared that no ayat could be abrogated. Please explain this.” 
Again, this was an extremely technical question, but one that provided 
the panel with a way to discuss arguments known by everybody in the 
audience and understood to conclusively prove the superiority of 
Ahmadi theology over that of many rival Sunni groups. All of the 
questions dealt with minute points of doctrine; all of them were 
phrased in just the right way to kindle the most spectacular examples 
of Ahmadi arguments to which no opponent could ever adequately 
respond. In all this, there was thus nothing that anyone in the audience 
hadn’t heard before. 
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This event was a presentation of the truths of Ahmadiyyat; a moment 
in which the Ahmadi community of Qadian offered these truths back 
upon itself to be seen. In both structure and content, the question and 
answer panel made reference to a series of televised Q&A sessions 
conducted by the Fourth Khalifa, which are frequently rebroadcast on 
the community’s satellite TV channel and known to all in Qadian. The 
mimicry of this televised series placed the Qadian event within a 
particular history; it heightened its formality as a the kind of event 
well-suited to the exemplary dissemination of Ahmadi doctrine, but 
most importantly, it drew attention to the nature of the event as a 
performance of a truth that had its origins not in the creativity of the 
panel, but in the divine inspiration of their spiritual leader. The 
exquisite ritual formality of the event underlined this performance as 
an offering of truth to Qadian.  
 
It was not, however, only the panel who enacted this formality. The 
audience did likewise, in their neat disciplined rows, in their 
compliance in asking the right questions, and in their careful listening. 
The event only worked because the audience fulfilled their obligation 
to see and receive truth, a fact that was recorded as the cameras 
panned across them. This is an obligation incumbent upon all Ahmadis 
in Qadian. It is an obligation placed on the believer every week during 
Friday sermons, when the manifold proofs of Ahmadiyyat are 
invariably recalled, and it is an obligation repeated in the everyday 
retelling of stories that demand the listener witness truth. We see, 
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crystallised in the performance of the panel and the performance of 
the audience the central dynamic that in Qadian determines what it 
means to be a good Ahmadi, and as we shall see, a good person.  
 
It is perhaps not surprising that Qadian’s daily religious discourse and 
its rituals of public edification are structured around a performance of 
truth to be witnessed, for the Ahmadis belong to a wider culture in 
which disputation is a complex ethical practice. Polemical 
argumentation forms a major part of the syllabuses of South Asian 
madrassas belonging to other sects, such as the Deobandis and 
Barelvis (Sikand 2005: 104), who also place great emphasis on the 
moral aspects of what might otherwise appear to be sterile forms of 
argumentation (compare Zaman 2007). The idea of disputation as an 
art to be mastered so that one can reduce opponents to silence also 
predates modern sectarian divisions in South Asia, and examples can 
be found in medieval debating cultures (Makdisi 1981: 132). The 
importance of such argumentative work is no doubt heightened for 
Ahmadis due to their need to constantly defend their contested 
muslimness, yet there is also a more fundamental distinction to Ahmadi 
practice, which is that the Ahmadis articulate a vision of moral 
character structured through heroic polemics. The reason for this is 
that emulating the character of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad means becoming 
an effective polemicist. As Naveeda Khan has noted, much sectarian 
debate in South Asia revolves around concerns of how to ground one’s 
imitation of Muhammad “in proper religious authority” (2006: 244). 
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For my interlocutors, Ahmad is the individual who most completely 
realised the sunnah (the exemplary model of life) of Muhammad; it is 
only by virtue of having been the most faithful and loving follower of 
Muhammad that Ahmad was able to achieve a shadow (zill) 
prophethood of his own. Ahmad’s prophethood thus reinvigorated 
Islam’s core model of exemplary personhood, for Ahmad was the 
person who most perfectly realised the exemplary model set by 
Muhammad, and Ahmad’s life was structured around a heroics of 
disputation. Thus, in Qadian the exemplary Islamic model of good 
character has become entwined with the role of moral polemicist. 
 
We have already seen that the potent truths of Ahmadiyyat are 
perceived as being capable of silencing opposition, but there are also 
more fundamental ways in which opponents are understood to fail to 
live up to the Ahmadi prophetic ideal of exemplary polemics, 
particularly in their failure to witness truth. It is commonly accepted in 
Qadian that an Ahmadi could only ever be beaten in debate if his 
opponent resorts to trickery and deception. In 2011, the Khalifa 
effectively banned individual Ahmadis from keeping a personal 
Facebook page. This was ostensibly due to the fact that the social 
network encourages relations between the sexes, and might lead to 
time wasting. Not everybody saw it in such a light, however, as one 
student missionary told me that there was a far more serious threat 
posed by social networks. His concern was that an Ahmadi might 
publicly post a religious message upon their profile, to which an 
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opponent would then reply with a hostile allegation (‘itiraaz) for all to 
see. I did not immediately understand the problem with this, for in my 
experience Ahmadis usually found such challenges to be at worst 
annoying and at best an opportunity to demonstrate the supremacy of 
their logical proofs. Yet my interlocutor explained that while there is 
no chance of an Ahmadi being beaten in an actual debate, there is still a 
danger. What if the Ahmadi were too busy to login to Facebook that 
day, and the allegation of the opponent remained unanswered on 
public display? The result, he informed me, could be highly damaging 
to the Jama‘at, for non-Ahmadis would start to assume wrongly that 
the Jama‘at has no response to such allegations.  The problem here 
was thus not that the proofs of Ahmadiyyat were somehow insufficient 
to counter any opponent, but that due to a technical lapse, they might 
appear to be so, and as will become apparent, this could lead to other 
observers being denied an opportunity to witness potent truths in 
action.  
 
The assumption behind my interlocutor’s story was that opponents all 
know that Ahmadi arguments are true and potent, and that they live in 
fear of them. It is for this reason, I was told, that Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad’s books are banned in Deoband. Pakistan’s mullahs – clerics 
who are widely stereotyped as ignorant and backward, and who are 
often associated with all that is wrong with Pakistan (for a full 
discussion see Khan 2012) – are seen as particularly guilty of publicly 
denying a truth they privately fear. I was repeatedly told in Qadian that 
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those mullahs who call for the persecution and even killing of Ahmadis 
in Pakistan all know that the arguments of the Jama‘at cannot be 
defeated, and it is for this reason that they attack Ahmadiyyat, for the 
potency of Ahmadi arguments threatens their ability to make money 
from religion. 
 
What separates the believer from the unbeliever is thus not a 
knowledge of the potency of divinely-inspired arguments, but the 
decision of what to do about that knowledge. While others are said to 
scramble to protect their reputations and financial interests, it is only 
the believer who publicly bears witness to this potency. These are 
truths that mould the moral character of the individual, and yet it is 
only the believer who will publicly recognize this as such. 
 
CREATING AND KNOWING THE GLOBAL JAMA‘AT 
 
While rational arguments constitute an important subset of the proofs 
of Ahmadiyyat, they are by no means the only truths that are 
witnessed in the daily life of Qadian’s believers. Indeed, the Jama‘at 
itself, as a material entity stretched across the globe, functioned as the 
most important manifestation of a truth that my interlocutors both 
sought to create through their actions and witness for its potency. 
 
One Ahmadi missionary whom I met in India had a very particular job 
in this regard. He was a member of the dawat-e-illallah team, a 
WITNESSING A POTENT TRUTH 
 19 
proselytising office of the Jama‘at, and he would spend several months 
at a time touring India. His mission was to combat opposition to the 
Jama‘at wherever it arose. His first task would be to set up a public 
meeting in the place where agitation against the Jama‘at was 
occurring. He would then call the opponents to a meeting, and ask 
them “what proof do you have? Show us your claim – establish it!” He 
would thus challenge them to beat him in rational argument, often 
with great rhetorical flourish: at this point, he told me, if there were 
ever proof, he would ask for a sword to be put to his neck. But, of 
course, there would not be. The next step of the process, however, was 
most revealing. Assuming that the opponents were not dangerous, 
then, rather than simply be satisfied that he had subdued them into 
silence with his overpowering proofs, he would instead ask them for 
permission to organize a joint “peace conference”. The media would be 
invited to this, and there would perhaps even be a press conference. 
The Ahmadis would then establish medical camps, bookstalls, and 
even blood donation camps. 
 
These were, of course, not just attempts at dialogue, but also 
arguments, rendered in a material language of visibility, for the truth 
of the Jama’at. Here, Ahmadi superiority was to be witnessed both in 
argument, and in the organisational capacity to carry out effective 
work. Just as Qadian’s missionaries simultaneously deploy and witness 
the arguments and polemics of Ghulam Ahmad, so too did my 
interlocutors continuously engage in a process of creating and 
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witnessing the truth of their movement in the organisational unity of 
the Jama‘at system. 
 
The most striking example of this is the way in which the globality of 
the movement comes to be both performed and witnessed as truth of 
Ahmadiyyat. For many in Qadian, and more broadly in Punjab, labour 
migration and transnational kinship are facts of life. Yet for Qadian’s 
Ahmadis, the global movement of people is frequently also understood 
as a religious act. In the 1970s and 1980s a large number of Ahmadis 
were forced to flee Pakistan due to the government’s increasingly 
hostile attitude toward the Jama‘at. Retrospectively, however, this was 
not understood to be a hardship. Rather, it was celebrated for having 
spread the Jama‘at ever further across the globe, thus fulfilling the 
prophecies of Ahmad.  
 
Transnational marriages are also seen to manifest truth through global 
community. In Qadian, households were connected by marriage to, 
among other places, Bangladesh, Germany, Indonesia, Mauritius, 
Nepal, Pakistan, the UK, and the USA, and these marriages were 
sometimes between older Ahmadi families and foreign converts. 
Occasionally, my interlocutors spoke very explicitly of these 
transnational marriages as creating the divine globality through which 
the truth of the Jama‘at could be known. One unmarried man in 
Qadian, already considered old to be a bachelor, decided to create a 
very specific transnational marriage. In February 2011, a brutal attack 
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by a mob of at least one thousand people in West Java, Indonesia, left 
three Ahmadis dead (BBC 2011). Graphic footage of the violence 
spread online, and in Qadian, my interlocutor watched these events 
with sadness. Upon discovering that one of the martyred Indonesians 
had left behind a widow, he thus decided to offer to marry her, an act 
that is considered significantly meritorious. Having never met her, he 
nonetheless made inquiries with the Indonesian Jama‘at about 
whether she would want to marry again. The process was long and 
complicated, and also involved taking permission from the Khalifa and 
asking for his prayers. The marriage, the groom insisted, was a purely 
spiritual union. Finally, the bride arrived for the wedding in Qadian, 
with a small delegation of other Indonesians. Her family had 
persuaded her to buy an expensive new dress for the wedding, but 
during the flight, of the 20 bags the Indonesians had with them, the bag 
containing this dress was the only one to get lost in transit. The groom 
interpreted this not as a loss, but rather as a divine sign that this 
wedding was not to be a worldly affair, but rather a pure spiritual 
union. His wife, he told me, had come only for Qadian. 
 
Hardship incurred in moving far from one’s home is often understood 
in terms of manifesting the global Jama‘at. Those who have dedicated 
their lives to Ahmadiyyat are given little choice about where the 
Jama‘at posts them. In India, this meant that many non-Punjabis were 
posted to Qadian. In spite of Qadian’s spiritual station, it was rarely 
their first choice of home, for it is hot, dusty, and lacking good local 
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schooling. To express any dissatisfaction, however, would be highly 
taboo, for duty should be seen to prevail. I spoke to a southerner, who 
seemed deeply upset about spending the rest of his life in Punjab, yet 
he justified this sacrifice by drawing attention to the way in which it 
was making prophecy visible; “it is prophesied that Qadian will extend 
to the river Beas. So this will come true, through families settling here 
from all over the world”. Hardship and sacrifice (qirbani) were seen as 
a necessary aspect of any life spent in the service of the Jama‘at; people 
would have to give up worldly riches and leave family far behind in 
order to serve the global community. But as the quote above 
illustrates, this sacrifice is never just a process of personal 
transformation; it is also a way of making the Jama‘at into an object to 
be seen.   
 
Migration and travel thus fulfil the prophecies that prove Ahmadiyyat, 
yet they also provide dispersed vantage points from which believers 
can then appreciate this proof. The question of whether a peripatetic 
life can lead to a heightened sense of community has been discussed, 
for example, by Anderson (1991) in his consideration of bureaucratic 
pilgrimages. Eickelman and Piscatori ask the question of whether 
there is any “direct, causal relationship” between experiences of travel 
and a sense of being Muslim (1990: 16). More recently, Marsden 
(2009b) has described regional travel undertaken by his Chitrali 
Muslim interlocutors as a moral practice premised upon the 
development of attachments to specifically local forms of 
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heterogeneity. In Qadian there is certainly a relationship between the 
ethical flourishing of the individual and travel, but it is neither direct 
nor causal. 
 
My interlocutors – particularly the young men of Qadian – found great 
pleasure in touring India. Yet almost all travel within the country 
involved a movement through the Jama‘at, with individuals staying at 
Ahmadi mission houses, which varied from the large mosques with 
attached living quarters in cities, to simple one-room huts in rural 
areas. To move was to experientially recreate the truth of the 
dispersed, expansive and unified Jama‘at. Moreover, while the 
religious landscape of India fascinated my interlocutors, this was 
because it opened up a space for observing the heterogeneity of Hindu 
and other Muslim groups, whose divisions could then be compared 
unfavourably with the global unity of the Jama‘at. 
  
Much the same was true for foreign travel. For Indians earning the 
salaries of Jama‘at employees in Qadian (approximately ₹  5000 in 
2011), visiting the West to see relatives and attend jalsa salanas is 
extremely difficult. Yet many did just this, particularly so as to attend 
the International Jalsa, which is held every year in the UK, and for 
which the Jama‘at in London offers some visa sponsorship. There are 
financial reasons why Indian Ahmadis in Europe will spend all their 
time moving through the landscape of the Jama‘at, indeed, even within 
India the practice of staying in mission houses when travelling was for 
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financial reasons as much as it was religious ones. Yet I was 
nonetheless intrigued by the extent to which foreign travel, when 
understood as a cultivating experience, occurred as a movement 
through the Jama‘at; a tour through industrial towns usually 
overlooked by tourists, which nonetheless have sizeable Ahmadi 
mosques. When I was visiting my own family in the UK during the 
summer of 2011, I met some friends from Qadian who had come to 
London for the International Jalsa. They were supposed to travel 
around the UK after this, but when the Khalifa’s mother died on 29th 
July, all plans were put on hold so that those present could be near the 
Khalifa in this time of mourning. For Ahmadis from Qadian, the UK was 
not a tourist destination in any traditional sense, but rather a place to 
experience proximity to the leader who unifies the movement. 
 
The act of travel was not a direct cause of moral development but 
rather a step toward the realisation of a moral self, for it was a process 
of understanding the global unity of the Jama‘at. Labour migrations, 
exile, transnational marriage, and travel all constantly remade an 
image of globality that is then placed before the believer. And as I 
discovered from personal experience, one is expected to respond to 
this image, for many in Qadian became increasingly exasperated that 
although I had lived in Qadian for 15 months and observed the global 
unity of the movement between London and Qadian, I was still failing 
to bear witness to the global Jama‘at as paradigmatic proof of 
Ahmadiyyat. 
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This is a potent truth, for in Qadian it is seen to change who we are. 
Why do I say this? It is because becoming a believer means recognising 
that these truths cannot be denied. Qadian’s Ahmadis rarely express 
their religious commitments in terms of belief or faith.  Instead, the key 
verb was to understand (samajhna) the religion. Conversion stories 
were stories of developing understanding. Becoming Ahmadi was 
always narrated, post facto, as a process of coming to understand the 
truths of the religion – both the abstract arguments and the material 
realisations of truth in the form of the global Jama‘at. When I was in 
the field, I was never asked if I had come to believe in Ahmadiyyat, but 
always if I had come to understand it. Yet this notion of understanding 
does not equate in any simple way with knowing, for as we saw in the 
preceding examples, even the most hardened opponents are thought 
to secretly know that Ahmadi truth cannot be denied. Likewise, I was 
rather confusingly told that some Ahamdis who had been living in 
Qadian for decades were morally lacking because they still did not 
truly understand the system of the Jama‘at. This seems odd only when 
we realise that understanding refers not just to abstract 
comprehension, but also to a total restructuring of one’s ethical life 
around the realisation that these are truths that cannot be denied, and 
that demand witnessing. I once asked a young friend of mine how he 
had felt upon the death of the Fourth Khalifa, and he replied that it had 
been a strange experience for him. He was perhaps 12 or 13 in 2003 
when the Fourth Khalifa passed away, and although people were 
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crying all around him, he could not really comprehend the cause of 
their grief. It was only gradually, as he matured, that he said that he 
began truly to understand the importance of Khilafat. Thus, years later, 
he one day found himself weeping when he finally understood the 
significance of the death of the Fourth Khalifa. For those who have 
understood Khilafat, the Khalifa is more than just a guru; he is the 
manifestation of the unity of the Ahmadiyya Jama‘at, and thus the most 
potent symbol of the Jama‘at’s superiority over its opponents. 
 
Understanding is about one’s entire epistemological stance; it is about 
one’s ability not just to see truth, but to publicly bear witness to that 
truth’s potent effect upon the self, for the very existence of the Jama‘at 
is a fact that imposes an obligation upon the world to respond in an 
ethical fashion. 
 
RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS 
 
We have seen that in Qadian, good character results from publicly 
bearing witness to a potent ethical truth. The question of how we are 
to understand this analytically points to more general complexities in 
the anthropological study of theisms. Two possible approaches are 
considered here. The first, most influentially demonstrated by 
Mahmood’s Politics of Piety (2005) is to stress the agentive capacity of 
the individual to engage in reflexive self-fashioning. The second 
approach, exemplified in the study of Islam by Mittermaier’s work 
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(2011, 2012a), is to take seriously the agentive capacity that a 
metaphysical other has to cultivate individuals.  I suggest that neither 
approach can wholly grasp what is happening in Qadian, primarily 
because of their excessive analytical focus upon agency. 
 
Mahmood’s model of ethics is important for having broadened our 
anthropological understanding of agency by delinking it from a 
progressive politics of liberation, and showing that those engaged in 
an ethical project of passivity can be acting in an agentive fashion 
(2005: 14). While this model of self-cultivation is effective in showing 
how people agentively work upon themselves, it remains less effective 
in accounting for situations in which people understand themselves to 
be changed through contact with compelling moral otherness, for 
example, the potent truths of Ahmadiyyat. Mahmood’s description of 
ethical self-cultivation is at heart an Aristotelian model that enables 
the secular discipline of anthropology to engage with a religious 
process of ethical becoming without ever having to deal with questions 
of how relationships to sacred others alter the self (by comparison, see 
Luhrmann 2012). 
 
I am not the first to point out that Aristotelian self-cultivation is an 
inadequate analytical tool for thinking about the ethical practices of 
many Muslim (and other) groups (see, for example, Anderson 2011). 
Mittermaier provides an alternative in her call for an ethics of the 
‘acted-upon’ self (Mittermaier 2012). Like Mahmood, Mittermaier 
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writes about Muslims in Cairo, and yet her focus is upon revelatory 
dreams, which are understood to present themselves to people, 
unbidden. Her model is one in which an ethics is possible precisely 
because it originates from beyond the individual. The importance of 
this account is that it moves us away from a subject-centred 
Aristotelian model of ethics (2012: 260), which has in recent years 
been applied by many anthropologists to ethics in general, but is in fact 
confusing for those situations where people strive to be ‘a patient who 
is acted upon' (Mittermaier 2011: 86). Her understanding of dreams is 
also purposefully non-Freudian, in that she ultimately privileges the 
agency of the dream over that of the dreamer. Dream stories, she tells 
us, ‘exceed the logic of self cultivation’, and they open up the idea that 
people are being constituted by experiences of alterity as much as they 
are cultivating them (2012: 5). Indeed, for Mittermaier, it is precisely 
this quality of alterity – this ability to ‘decenter the self-contained self’ 
(2011: 171) – that makes dreams both ethical and political. 
 
This analysis speaks to my ethnography of Qadian.  Like dreams, the 
potent proofs of Ahmadiyyat are said to present themselves unbidden 
to subjects. Moreover, as in Mittermaier’s discussion of dream visions, 
these potent proofs place an obligation to respond upon the 
individual9. Why, then, should my analysis not simply follow my 
interlocutors in seeing the act of witnessing as a practice of patient-
hood that allows for the potent truths of Ahmadiyyat to constitute the 
subject? Such an approach has the advantage of appearing to take 
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seriously the metaphysical world of those in Qadian. And yet, it would 
do so only superficially, and ultimately, it would obscure the actual 
ethical work of being an Ahmadi. 
 
To develop this point, it is worth introducing an idea from Laidlaw, 
namely that a focus on responsibility – as something with a genealogy 
that is embedded in historically instituted practices and relations – is 
often more analytically productive than a focus on agency (Laidlaw 
2010, 2014). He argues that analytical conceptions of agency, 
particularly as found in ‘practice theory’ or Actor-Network Theory, 
distract us from the ethnographic insight that for the people we study, 
the question of what has happened is inseparable from and partly 
constituted by our judgements about its ethical character (Laidlaw 
2014: 185). In fact, determining causal significance is never just a 
factual matter, for an account’s explanatory power is always linked to 
the question of whom it is for. Drawing on Bernard Williams, Laidlaw 
seeks to show how negotiations of responsibility are always also a 
question of what has been done. And thus, he argues that the question 
of when a person’s actions might be considered their own is never just 
a question of agency and structure: it is also a question of ‘blame and 
responsibility, as an aspect of the relational processes whereby 
stretches, phases, or stages of people’s ongoing conduct are 
interpreted as acts for which distinct agents (of varying shape and 
size) are accountable’ (Laidlaw 2014: 197). 
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This is thus a move toward an analytical framework that attends to the 
way in which questions of blame and responsibility are always also 
ethical decisions. The question becomes; how do our interlocutors 
establish responsibility? It is worth asking what this might mean for an 
analytically rigorous anthropology of theisms, particularly with regard 
to the question, raised by both my own ethnography and that of 
Mittermaier, as to whether divine truths or visitational dreams might 
be seen to have agency. 
 
While my interlocutors in Qadian see the truth of Ahmadiyyat as 
always agentive, the difference that they insist separates them from 
their opponents is the fact that they have chosen, unlike those 
opponents, to recognize this transformative potential of Ahmadi 
truths. If we as analysts take as the starting point of our empirical 
description the notion that these truths have agency, we miss the fact 
that such a state of affairs is always the result of an ethical decision. 
Attempting to do our interlocutors justice by taking seriously their 
view of the world thus ends up reducing the ethical quality of their 
actions. If, instead of stressing the agency of either the subject or the 
potent truths, we begin to think about how our interlocutors are 
assigning responsibility, then the actual ethical work being undertaken 
becomes clearer, for this ethical work is the decision to recognize the 
agentive power of truth; in short, to see this truth as being responsible 
for a given state of affairs. For the Ahmadis, ethics is thus about 
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making a decision to see divine truth  - and thus ultimately God – as 
being responsible for one’s own ethical potentiality. 
 
RESPONSIBILITY AND COHERENCE 
 
Turning from agency to responsibility can also help explain why in 
Qadian, good character is above all judged by one’s decision to attest to 
Ahmadi truth being indomitable. Within recent anthropological studies 
of Islam, ethical projects such as the one I describe, which value total 
coherence and discipline, have been the object of much debate, one 
suggestion being that they are as much a fiction of anthropological 
analysis as they are an ethnographic reality (e.g. Janson 2014; Marsden 
2009a). Most relevant is Schielke’s argument that Mahmood’s focus on 
the supposedly singularly disciplined lives of Salafi activists covers up 
the multiplicities and ambivalences of their everyday lives (Mahmood 
2005; Schielke 2009).  Schielke argues that the picture painted by 
Mahmood of Muslim self-cultivation is something of an analytical 
fantasy; a product of her concentration on the lives of activists, and her 
confusion of goals with outcomes. People may try to live by a doctrine 
that ‘has as its declared aim the abolition of ambivalence and the 
imposition of clarity’ (2009: S32), but his ethnography shows that 
ultimately such efforts lead to greater fragmentation of the individual. 
This happens as people find themselves torn between opposing 
teleologies of the subject. 
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In Qadian, people cannot simply slip in and out of the Jama‘at in the 
manner in which Schielke describes his interlocutors’ flirtations with 
Salafi lifestyles. The Jama‘at is the only major employer of Ahmadis in 
the town and there are a number of mechanisms in place to ensure 
people’s continued participation in community events.  That does not, 
however, mean that there is a sense that everybody is always acting 
correctly. In fact, discourse in Qadian is imbued with the idea that the 
town is in a state of irreversible moral decline. At the heart of this 
discourse is a sense of isolation from the wellspring of Khilafat: 
Qadian, having been separated from its spiritual leader for over 60 
years, is now drifting slowly away from the prophetic ideal. The town, I 
was told, was now full of money-grabbing individuals with little sense 
of the true meaning of the Jama‘at. On several occasions, the head of 
the community in Qadian made quite clear that he was granting me 
extended permission to work in Qadian only because I was keeping 
good company and not investigating the less-than-ideal behaviour of 
some Ahmadis in Qadian. Corruption was, moreover, not limited to 
marginal Ahmadis. People spoke privately of a rot within the Jama‘at 
hierarchy caused by officials who abused positions of power for 
financial gain. Yet this talk of decline was accompanied by another, 
contradictory discourse. As often as I was advised to be wary of 
personal morals in Qadian, I would be advised to look to Qadian as an 
exemplary place; to witness Qadian as a manifestation of the truth of 
Ahmadiyyat. The same religious bureaucracy that was said to be 
collapsing under the weight of nepotism was also presented to me for 
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witnessing as an exemplary, divinely inspired system. In these 
moments, Qadian was heralded as the most peaceful place on earth, 
and its people the most spiritual. 
 
How could two such contradictory ideas coexist? One answer is to 
follow Schielke and conclude that the project of perfection espoused 
by my interlocutors is an idealised fiction that hides a reality of 
ambiguity and multiplicity.  Doing so makes much anthropological 
sense, for insightful ethnography is usually seen to emphasize the 
heterogeneous and the multiple (for a fine example in a recent study of 
a Muslim society see Marsden 2005). This is no surprise, for if we take 
agency – that is, everything that people and things do (in a very 
Latourian sense) – as our proper object of study, then multiplicities 
will overwhelm. Charting networks and mapping agencies will always 
produce an analysis that in its completeness makes a mockery of the 
ethical projects that our interlocutors espouse. But does determining 
who did what with ever greater detail really help us to understand 
what matters for our interlocutors (Laidlaw 2010: 147)? Or does it 
lead to a confusion of the deep and the hidden with the authentic?10 
The important point is that not all discontinuities are seen as equally 
threatening in Qadian. When, we have to ask, are people held 
accountable for major moral failure? Both Ahmadis and the opponents 
of the Jama‘at are routinely held accountable for two major faults. 
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The first fault is being unable to performatively enact truth in such a 
way that its witnessing can lead to the development of moral 
character. An obvious consequence of this is that minor instances of 
moral failure in Qadian only become truly problematic when they 
shatter the exemplary image of the town. As one young Ahmadi 
smoking a secret cigarette once confided in me, “the problem is not 
that I am doing this; it is that I am doing it in front of you”.  There are 
also more serious ways in which the inability to present a truth that 
can be witnessed comes to be seen as symptomatic of the moral failure 
of the Jama‘at’s opponents. A friend in Qadian once showed me an anti-
Ahmadi video on his mobile phone, which was made by a well-known 
Internet opponent of the Jama‘at. My friend was dismissive of the 
video, not just because of its content, but because it had been produced 
in such a way that demonstrated its maker did not understand how to 
engage correctly in disputation. “What is the proper way for a person 
to make a criticism?” he asked, before continuing, “they should first 
call a press conference, and gather people together, and say, ‘we will 
be making these allegations, and then backing them up with such-and-
such data within a given period of time’.” In other words, the opponent 
lacked more than just strong arguments; he also lacked a sense of how 
to performatively enact truth in the world. Absent from this 
opponent’s performance were precisely those qualities of formality 
and documentability that made the question and answer session with 
which we began this chapter a thing to behold. 
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The second, and perhaps most intolerable, fact about opponents was 
not the fact that they persecute Ahmadis, but that they do so in spite of 
their knowledge of the potency of Ahmadi proofs. Among the global 
elite of the movement whom I met in London or as they travelled 
through Qadian, it was standard to refer to the persecution of Ahmadis 
by reference to an international discourse of religious rights and 
freedoms. In India, however, especially among some older members of 
the Jama‘at, a different discourse dominated. Instead of feeling outrage 
because the religious freedoms of Ahmadis are denied in Pakistan, 
they felt outrage at the fact that Ahmadis there are denied the ability to 
speak the truth. People would thus recount Pakistan’s 1974 hearings 
against the Ahmadis not as violations of rights and freedoms, but as 
violations against truth. For these people, the scandal was not about 
free speech; the scandal was that the Ahmadis were able to prove 
everything they said, and yet knowing this, the Pakistani government 
continued to deny this truth and persecute the Jama‘at. 
 
These are the major moral faults in Qadian, and understanding this 
enables us to see how coherent, disciplined moral character is 
produced out of a process in which the performative manifestation of 
truth establishes criteria and obligations against which a person can 
subsequently be held accountable (Lambek 2013). Ahmadi 
deployments of proofs and arguments are, to draw on Lambek’s use of 
Walsh (2002), rituals which not only fulfil responsibility, but also 
produce it (Lambek 2013: 840; see also Rappaport 1999).  My 
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interlocutors performatively manifest the truth of Ahmadiyyat – for 
example through heroic polemics or prophecy-fulfilling migration – 
and this produces an obligation to be a particular kind of witness. 
Being a consistently good Ahmadi is a question of accountability over 
time to this obligation. 
 
For those in Qadian, coherent moral character is a question of one’s 
accountability to truth over time, and thus it is not simply a question of 
the sum total of one’s actions. Understanding this means shifting our 
analysis away from agency, and instead looking at the complex 
working out of the responsibilities and accountabilities that emerge 
from of being a witness to divine truth. It means understanding how 
the performance of truth might create obligations over time, and why 
this, rather than any sum total of one’s actions, is the basis of being a 
good Ahmadi. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
My interlocutors understand their ethical work to involve both 
presentation of truth to the world, and a witnessing of that truth. For 
Qadian’s Ahmadis, witnessing the truth means recognising its capacity 
to shape a subject and place obligation upon that subject. If 
anthropologists have, in recent years, run into difficulties in their 
attempts to understand ethical relations of submission to a 
metaphysical other, I suggest that such relationships might best be 
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analysed in terms of the decisions being made on the part of the 
believer about the nature of responsibility within the world.  
  
This style of analysis has a long yet buried history in anthropological 
studies of Muslim societies. Ethnographers of spirit possession in 
particular have had to deal with the analytical challenge of accounting 
for beings who are clearly said to impact the world, but about whom 
anthropologists must be professionally agnostic. Crapanzano’s (1973) 
study of the Hamadsha is perhaps the best example. Whilst it is often 
dismissed for its psychoanalytical approach (el-Zein 1977), it can 
instead be read as an ethnography of a ritual process in which an 
individual comes to make an ethical decision to accept that another is 
responsible for what is done to them, and that they are then 
subsequently obliged to respond to this other. To understand spirit 
possession, Crapanzano asks about neither the agency of the spirit nor 
the agency of the possessed, but rather about the ways in which rituals 
mediate social distributions of responsibility. 
 
To focus on responsibility in this way is thus to adopt an 
anthropological approach that neither effaces our interlocutors’ 
metaphysics, nor dismisses their projects of perfection as illusory. 
Instead, it can elucidate the ways in which people understand 
themselves to be changed by relationships to a metaphysical other, 
which are so often characteristic of theisms. 
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NOTES 
 
                                                        
1 A schism occurred in 1914 due to controversy over the election of 
Ahmad’s son as the second Khalifa. A dissenting group was established 
in Lahore, although their numbers remain very small, and none are to 
be found in Qadian. 
2 British Library: IOR/L/PJ/7/12415. 
3 Census of India, 2011. 
4 Because of the strict nature of public gender segregation in Qadian, 
my interactions with women were always extremely limited, and 
consequently, this paper focuses exclusively on the male population of 
the town.  
5 http://www.jalsasalana.org/etiquette.html, accessed on 
08/09/2012. 
6 The Urdu terms dala’il and sabut are both used, although it is not 
unusual to hear the English word proof. 
7 Khatam an-nabiyin (seal of the prophets) is a title given to 
Muhammad in the Qur’an (33:40), often understood to imply that 
Muhammad was the final prophet. Ahmadis, by contrast, argue that 
Muhammad as seal is not inconsistent with the existence of another 
prophet following within Muhammad’s prophethood. 
8 Naskh, or abrogation, is a major theological issue in Islam, regarding 
the question of how to deal with seemingly contradictory verses in the 
Qur’an. 
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9 Mittermaier describes how the imperative to visit a saint’s shrine can 
come not from personal desire, but ‘from an Elsewhere’ (2011: 163). 
10 A notion that has long been challenged in anthropological writing on 
Islam (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1986; Deeb 2006). 
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